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ADVERSE POSSESSION-CLAIM OF RIGHT-GOOD FAIT.-The plaintiff had been
in possession of the land in question for more than thirty years under a claim
of right, but in i8g, before the statutory period of ten years had run, a judg-
ment was rendered against him in an action to quiet title. The record title to
the land later passed to the defendant, but the plaintiff continued in open and
hostile possession for another eighteen years. The plaintiff sought to quiet title
in himself and to restrain the defendant from entering the premises. Held, that
such relief should be refused, because the plaintiff's possession subsequent to the
judgment of 1899 lacked such good faith in his claim of right as would enable
him to assert title through adverse possession. Bryan v. Christianson (i92O,
Iowa) 176 N. W. 702.
It is generally held that the adverse possession which is requisite to establish
title and to bar the rights of the ousted owner must be actual (as to part of the
land), hostile, visible, notorious and exclusive, continuous for the statutory
period, and under claim or color of title. See Ballantine, Claim of Title in
Adverse Possession (igig) 28 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 219. The question whether
good faith is an essential element of adverse possession is the subject of con-
siderable conflict. It has been said that the conflict, not only between different
jurisdictions but within the same jurisdiction, defies reconciliation. See Lamp-
man v. Van Alstyne (1896) 94 Wis. 417, 426, 69 N. W. 171, 174. It would seem,
however, that the trend of decisions since that day has been largely in one direc-
tion. The early view that the statute of limitations operated by a presumed
acquiescence on the part of the ousted owner favored the growth of the require-
ment of good faith, since bad faith on the part of the possessor obviously re-
butted the presumption. Cf. Louisville & IV. R. R. v. Smith (19o7) 125 Ky. 336,
101 S. W. 317. The prevalent, and seemingly more accurate, view is that the
statute is one "of repose." Lampnumn v. Van Alstyne, supra; McAllister v.
Hartzel (18gg) 6o Oh. St. 69, 53 N. E. 715. Its object is not to aid the guilty
disseisor, but to penalize the negligence of the owner in not bringing his action
within the prescribed period. See COMMENT' (1919) 29 YALE LA w JOURNAL, 91,
95. The statute being based on the lapse of time, its very nature is to mature "a
wrong into a right" by cutting off the remedy. Humbert v. Trinity Church
(184o, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 24 Wend. 587. To hold that good faith is necessary to
make possession adverse is simply to magnify the state of mind of the party and
to dwarf his acts. Cf. McAllister v. Hartzel, supra. Much confusion has arisen
from the failure to distinguish between good faith as one of the evidential facts
determining whether or not the possession was really hostile, and good faith as
an operative fact in creating "adverse possession." Cf. Johns v. Johns (1914)
244 Pa. 48, 90 AtI. 535; see Roe v. Doe ex dem. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co.
(igog) 162 Ala. 151, 158, 50 So. 23o, 232. A few jurisdictions in that minority
group which still regards color of title, i. e. some instrument purporting to convey
the property, as an essential element in adverse possession, hold that good faith
is also necessary. Stone v. Kansas City & W. B. Ry. (914) p6i Mo. 61, i6g
S. W. 88; West v. Middlesex Banking Co. (914) 33 S. D. 465, 146 N. W. 598.
Constructive adverse possession under color of title almost always requires it.
The great weight of authority, however, would seem to be against the necessity
of good faith as to land actually occupied, even under color of title. 15 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1233, note. There is no decision of recent years which holds squarely
with the principal case that good faith is necessary to a claim of right. It would
seem that the Iowa courts, while they are consistent with their own historic rule
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as frequently laid down, are opposed to the weight of modern authority, and by
thus preventing a trespasser from relying on the statute of limitations are
destroying an important effect of the statute.
BILLS AND NOTEs-AGREEMENT TO REw.-The plaintiff orally agreed with the
defendant's agent some time before the defendant's note came due to renew it
at maturity for four months, upon payment of interest then due and $250.
Prior to the maturity of the note the defendant's agent tendered the new note,
the interest, and $250, which the plaintiff refused. He then brought an action on
the original note. The defendant pleaded that the action was prematurely
brought as the period had not expired .for which the note sued upon was to be
renewed. Held, that the plaintiff should recover, with a dictum that the defend-
ant might have redress in another action on the breach of contract to renew.
West v. Jones (1919, Del.) io8 AtI. 675.
The decision is in accord with the general (though inadequate) rule that
though a contract to forbear for a definite time to sue upon a contract is itself a
valid contract, if supported by a consideration, the contract to forbear cannot be
pleaded in bar to an action brought on the original contract, although the time
of forbearance has not elapsed. Bridge v'. Tierman. (1865) 36 Mo. 439; Brown
v. Shelby (89) 4 Ind. App. 477, 31 N. E. 89; see Daniel, Negotiable Istru-
ments (6th ed. 1913) secs. 158, 159. The cases agree with the principal case in
following the doctrine of Ford v. Beech (1847) 11 Q. B. 852. But in that case
the agreement to renew was made after maturity, whereas in the principal case
it was made prior to maturity. For the effect of the parol evidence rule where
the agreement is contemporaneous with the note, see (igig) 28 YALE LAw
JOURNAT, 823. It is conceivable that the breach of such an agreement might
cause irreparable damage, as where the maker of the note, relying on the agree-
ment, might not make arrangements to meet it, and become financially em-
barrassed. Where the legal remedy is inadequate, executory accords have been
enforced in equity, if tender has been made. See (ig2o) 29 ibid., 114. It has
been suggested that an accord like the one in the principal case might be sus-
tained as an equitable defence, giving to the defendant an irrevocable power to
extinguish his former duty by tender. See Corbin, Discharge of Contracts (1913)
22 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 513, 529; see Wald, Pollock on Contracts (Williston's
ed. i9o6) 833; cf. Innes v. Munro (1847) 1 Exch. 473. Nevertheless there seems
to be no case which so holds. Such an agreement does operate, however, to
release a surety on the original note. Bank v. Woodward (1829) 5 N. H. 99;
Windhorst v. Bergendahl (19o7) 21 S. D. 218, III N. W. 544. This would tend
to indicate that the payee's right arising from the note should be suspended until
the time agreed upon had expired. It seems clear that to allow the equitable
defence would avoid circuity of action.
CARRIERS-TORTS OF SERVANTS-CONTRACTUAL DuTY TO CARRY SAFELY.-The
plaintiffs employed the defendant, a private carrier, .to convey their goods, which
the defendant's driver stole. The defendant had not been guilty of any negli-
gence in selecting the driver. Held, that the plaintiff should not recover, because
the defendant had not held out the driver as one having authority to do the act
which caused the loss. Mintz v. Silzerton. (192o, K. B.) 36 Times L. R. 399.
Manifestly in the instant case in tortiously converting the goods, the driver
of the defendant was not acting within the scope of his employment, and the
maxim respondeat superior does not apply. Cf. Cheshire v. Bailey (19o4, C. A.)
21 Times L. R. 130. In the United States, also, the defendant is not responsible
for the driver's tort on this theory. Cf. Vandeyinark v. Corbett (igog) 131 App.
Div. 391, 1I5 N. Y. Supp. 911. The defendant, however, having lawfully ac-
quired possession of the plaintiff's goods as bailee for hire, was under a duty
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to exercise reasonable care to protect them. See Dobie, Bailments and Carriers
(1914) 154, note 92. He could delegate the performance of his contractual duty
of carriage to a servant; but as bailee he was still under a common-law duty
to accomplish their safe carriage. See VanZile, Bailments and Carriers (2d ed.
i9o8) iII. So it would seem that American courts would hold that he was
under a contractual duty to deliver the plaintiff's goods at the agreed place,
the performance of which was not excused by the driver's conversion of the
goods while transporting them. See Hasbrouck v. New York Central & H. R.
R. R. (Igv1) 202 N. Y. 363, 374, 95 N. E. 808, 812. The Wisconsin court in a
famous case, where the conductor of a railroad kissed an unwilling female pas-
senger, imposed a similar duty upon the carrier to protect its passengers from
the insults of its servants. Craker v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. (1875) 36 Wis.
657. Commenting on this case, a learned English author said that such a decision
was in effect to hold that the master warranted the moral impeccability of his
servants. See Beven, Negligence (3d ed. i9o8) vii. This clearly indicates the
English viewpoint and its refusal to recognize the master's duties in this regard.
The instant case is in accord with the majority of the English adjudications, but
it seems that few American courts would follow it. For a discussion of a
master's criminal responsibility for the acts of his servant, see (I919) 28 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 700.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAv-ADMIRALTY-STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS
NOT MADE APPLICABLE To ADMIRALTY BY ACT OF OCTOBER 6, 1917.The plaintiff,
whose husband was drowned in the Hudson river on August 3, 1918, while doing
work of a maritime nature, had obtained an award of compensation for herself
and minor children under New York law. Held, that the award was invalid
since the Act of Congress of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. L. 395, saving from the
grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts by the Judiciary Act "to
claimants the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of
any State," violates the grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts by
article 3, section 2 of the federal Constitution. Holmes, Pitney, Brandeis and
Clarke, JJ., dissenting. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart (May 17, 1920) U. S.
Sup. Ct. Oct. Term 1919, No. 543.
This decision reverses (1919) 226 N. Y. 302, 123 N. E. 382 and overrules The
Steamship Howell (1919, S. D. N. Y.) 257 Fed. 578, (1919) 28 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 835 and approves Rhode v. Grant Smith Pater Co. (1919, D. Ore.) 259
Fed. 304. As already indicated in the JOURNAL, the decision logically follows
from Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct 524, (1917)
27 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 255, 269, 924, where by the same division of the Court
as in the instant case state workmen's compensation laws were held unconstitu-
tional when applied to maritime torts. See also (1918), 28 YALE LAw JOURNAL,
251; cf. (i920) 29 ibid., 362. Though the Act here in question was passed to
avoid the effect of that decision the objections raised by the majority could not
be removed by Congress. The decision itself was not unexpected but it does
accentuate the unfortunate results of the earlier decision. Justice Holmes
argues that Congress has by this Act made the state laws federal, citing Clark
Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. (1917) 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct I8o, (1917)
26 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 399, sustaining the act of Congress which prohibited the
shipment of intoxicating liquor from one state into another when intended for
use contrary to the latter's law. The majority answer distinguished that case on
the ground that the constraint, i e., the will causing the prohibition came from
Congress, and reassert the doctrine that the legislative power of Congress cannot
be delegated to the states.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-STATE REGULATION OF GAS
RATES.-The plaintiff company piped natural gas from its wells in Pennsylvania
directly to its consumers in New York. The Public Service Commission of
New York proposed to fix the gas rates to be charged the consumer. The
plaintiff sued out a writ of prohibition; alleging that the attempted regulation
was an interference with interstate commerce. Held, that the writ should be
vacated, because the regulation was local and in a field which Congress had not
occupied. Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission (192o) 40 Sup.
Ct. 279.
It is well settled that interstate transmission of oil or gas by pipe line is inter-
state commerce. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. (1911) 221 U. S. 229, 31 Sup.
Ct. 564. And this is true where the pipe line owner also owns the commodity
transmitted. Pipe Line Cases (1914) 234 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 956. It is gen-
erally stated that a transaction remains interstate commerce while the goods
remain in the "original packages." Leisy v. Hardin (189o) 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup.
Ct. 681 (state statute forbidding sale of liquor held invalid). The principal case
held gas to be the subject of interstate commerce up to and including its sale to
the consumer. But the decision was carefully distinguished from the case where
an intervening local concern received the gas and itself dealt with the con-
sumer. The gas was said to have there lost its interstate character and become
wholly subject to state regulation. Public Utilities Commission v. Landon (igi)
249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268. It is submitted that any attempt to draw an
exact line where federal control ends and state control begins is generally both
difficult and misleading. Cf. Western Union v. Foster (1918) 247 U. S. io5,
38 Sup. Ct. 438 (interstate telegrams); cf. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. (1917)
242 U. S. 539, 37 Sup. Ct 217 (interstate commerce in stocks). Films though in
their "original packages" in the hands of the consignee, have been forbidden
exhibition by state censorship regulations. Mutual Film Corporation v. Ohio
Industrial Commission (1915) 236 U. S. 230, 35 Sup Ct. 387. It is enough to
say the state may regulate where Congress has not acted, if the subject does
not require national uniformity. See (192o) 29 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 456. But
"the federal power is paramount and continues until the commodity has ceased
to be the subject of discriminating legislation by reason of its foreign char-
acter." See Welton v. Missouri (1876) 9I U. S. 275, 282. For an excellent dis-
cussion of the power of a state to change the rates of a public service corporation
established by contract, see Burdick, Regulating Franchise Rates (1920) 29 YALE
LAw JOURNAL, 589.
CONTRACS--ENTIRE OR SEVERABLE-INTENT OF PRTIES.-The defendant con-
tracted to build a sea-wall for the plaintiff city. Payment was to be made in
installments estimated on the basis of each cubic yard of excavation, rip-rap and
fill accepted by the city engineer each month, and a balance on completion. A
stipulation placed the risk of loss of work and material on the defendant. When
the structure was nearly complete, a storm seriously damaged the wall. The
defendant refused to make repairs, claiming that the contract was severable and
that the stipulation did not apply to work performed and accepted. The plaintiff
sued to recover damages for this refusal. Held, that the plaintiff should recover.
City of Bridgeport v. T. A. Scott Co. (i92o, Conn.) 1o9 AtI. 162.
After partial performance the entirety or severability of a contract becomes
a very important factor in determining the promisor's position. Has he a right
to all or part of the price? Has he the privilege of retaining it after payment,
when he becomes unwilling or unable to continue, or when the works are
destroyed? Is he under a duty to complete performance or answer in damages
for breach? In deciding any one of these issues the decisions of the courts as
to entirety or severability have been the same upon similar facts. The cases
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generally agree that the intention of the parties determines whether or not the
contract is entire. The intention is to be gathered from the language used and
the nature of the subject-matter. See Dick v. Riddle (xog) 139 Mo. App. 584,
589, 123 S. W. 486, 487; see Hodson-Feenaughty Co. v. Coast Culvert and Flume
Co. (1919, Ore.) 178 Pac. 382, 388. Where the performance, left incomplete by
the promisor, required further expenditure of work or materials to fit it to the
purpose designed by the promisee, the contract was held entire. School District v.
Dauchy (1857) 25 Conn. 530; International Contracting Co. v. United States
(1911) 47 Ct. Cl. 158; see Shinn v. Bodine (1869) 6o Pa. 182, 185. It has been
held that where the price was to be paid in a lump sum, the contract was entire.
Collins v. Frazier (1919, Ga.) 98 S. E. 188; Pitcairn v. Phillip-Hiss Co. (19o2,
D. Pa.) 113 Fed. 492. Where the performance consists of separate and distinct
items and the price is apportioned to each, the contract has usually been con-
strued as severable. Amsler v. Bruner (1912) 173 Ill. App. 337; Parkersburg &
Marietta Sand Co. v. Smnith (1915) 76 W. Va. 246, 85 S. E. 516. But the fact
that the price is apportioned is not conclusive. Steere v. Fornilli (1918, Calif.)
175 Pac. 8o6; Grassman v. Bonn (i88o, Ch.) 32 N. J. Eq. 43. In the instant
case the express stipulation that the contractor should bear the risk of loss of
work and materials, taken with the fact that the parties seem to have contem-
plated a complete sea-wall, justifies the holding that the contract is entire.
CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY-OPTION CONTRACTS FOR FUTURE DF.LIVERY.In con-
sideration of $8o.oo the defendant gave to the plaintiff an option on 8,ooo bushels
of corn for December delivery at $1.4o per bushel. On the plaintiff's election
to purchase the corn, the defendant refused to deliver, claiming that it was a
gaming contract and therefore illegal. The plaintiff brought an action for breach
of contract for the sale and delivery of the corn. Held, that he should recover.
Yontz v. McVeans (1920, Mo.) 217 S. W. 1000.
Contracts in which the parties intend to wager on the future price of a com-
modity with the understanding that no delivery is to be made, but that there
shall be a mere "settlement of differences," are illegal and unenforceable. Ray-
mond v. Parker (1911) 85 Conn. 694, 81 AtI. 1030; Lamson v. Bane (1913,
C. C. A. 8th) 2o6 Fed. 253. The illegality of such transactions is determined by
whether or not there was an actual intent on the part of both the plaintiff and
the defendant to deliver, make payment for, and receive the commodities. See
Graff v. Moench (1913) 181 Ill. App. 127, 13o; see Rogers v. Marriott (19oo)
59 Neb. 759, 772, 82 N. W. 21, 24. Option contracts in which there is actually
an intention to deliver if the option is exercised, are likewise valid. Schmidt v.
Marine Milk Condensing Co. (1915) 197 Ill. App. 279; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Progressive Gin Co. (19x6) 59 Okla. 262, 159 Pac. 349. An option contract for
future delivery, as in the instant case, is valid even where the seller does not at
the time of giving the option own the goods. Wiggin v. Federal Stock & Grain
Co. (9o5) 77 Conn. 5o7, 59 AtI. 6o7; Sawyer Wallace Co. v. Taggart (1879,
Ky.) 14 Bush, 727. If one party intends actual delivery, but the other intends a
"settlement of differences" only, the contract may be enforced at the option of
the one intending actual delivery. Merriam & Millard Co. v. Cole (1917, Tex.
Civ. App.) 198 S. W. 1054; Donovan v. Daiber (igoo) 124 Mich. 49, 82 N. W.
848; contra, Elnore-Schultz v. Stonebraker (1919, Mo.) 214 S. W. 216. A few
courts have tried to lay down general rules for determining this intention to
deliver. The majority of these courts hold that where nothing is said about
actual delivery, the presumption is that the contract is legal and the burden of
proof is upon the defendant to show its illegality. See Lamson Bros v. Mensen
(1919, Iowa) 174 N. W. 689; see Miller Co. v. Klovstad (!9o5) 14 N. D. 435, 1oS
N. W. 164; see Anson, Contract (3d Am. ed. by Corbin, 1919) 281, note; contra,
Pate v. Wilson Bros. Mercantile Co. (1919, Tex. Civ. App.) 209 S. W. 187. It
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seems evident, however, that these rules cannot be relied upon with certainty.
In this connection, it has been held that where the contract, though legal on its
face, is so made that its undisclosed but real purpose is to deal in cotton futures,
parol evidence is admissible to establish the real intention of the parties. Talbot
& Son v. Martindale (xgig, Tex. Civ. App.) 211 S. W. 302. For an accurate
analysis of option contracts, see Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (1913)
23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 16, 44; see Corbin, Option Contracts (1914) 23 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 641.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-INTOXICATION AS AN ExcusE-The accused, in the
act of violating a young girl, placed his hand upon her mouth to quiet her
thereby causing her death by suffocation. The lower court assumed that the
accused had the intent to rape, but on the ground of intoxication reduced the
verdict from murder to manslaughter. Held, that the verdict of murder should
be restored, since the death was caused by an act of violence done in furtherance
of a felony. Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard (192o, H. L.) 36 Times
L. R. 379.
An unlawful homicide, perpetrated in the commission of an offense amounting
to a felony, is generally held to be murder. State v. Cross (I9OO) 72 Conn. 722,
46 Atl. 148; Regina v. Serne (1887, Cent Cr. Ct.) I6 Cox C. C. 311. Formerly
drunkenness was held to aggravate, rather than excuse or mitigate a crime.
See Hale, Pleas of the Crown (1778) 32; see 4 Blackstone, Commentaries (21st
ed. 1852) 26. A few isolated cases in the United States have held that drunken-
ness was not a fact to be considered in determining the degree of the crime.
United States v. McGle (1851, C. C. D. Mass.) I Curtis, I; Commonwealth v.
Hawkins (1855, Mass.) 3 Gray, 463; State v. Brown (19o4) 181 Mo. 192, 79
S. W. iiii. Where a person with the intention of killing becomes intoxicated,
though at the time of the killing he was too drunk to form any intent whatsoever,
the intoxication is no excuse. Cook v. State (19o3) 46 Fla. 20, 35 So. 665;
State v. Robinson (1882) 20 W. Va. 713. But intoxication such that the person
is incapable of forming an intent always reduces murder from the first to the
second degree, unless the intention to kill existed before the intoxication. People
v. Rogers (1858) 18 N. Y. 9. But the usual rule would seem to be that it does
not reduce the offense from murder in the second degree to manslaughter. State
v. Johnson (1874) 41 Conn. 584; Atkins v. State (19o7) 119 Tenn. 458, 1O5 S. W.
353. In some cases where the rule is apparently contrary, the cases are based
upon the statutory requirement of a specific intent for murder. State v. Rumble
(19o9) 81 Kan. 6, lO5 Pac. I; Perryman v. State (1916) 12 Okla. Cr. 5oo, 159
Pac. 937; see Cook, Act, Intention, and Motive in the Criminal Law (1917)
26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 645. A number of jurisdictions require the existence of
a specific intent to do at least serious bodily harm to constitute the crime of
murder. As a logical result in those jurisdictions such a degree of intoxication
reduces the crime to manslaughter. State v. Corrivan (1904) 93 Minn. 38, IOO
N. W. 638; Springfield v. State (1892) 96 Ala. 81, 11 So. 250. England follows
this doctrine. Regina v. Doherty (1887, Cent Cr. Ct) 16 Cox C. C. 306. The
instant case appears to be entirely sound on its facts and in accord with the
English concept of the crime of. murder.
FaRuD-PomissoRy STATEMENTS-INTENTION NOT TO PE 'o a-A MisREPRE-
SENTATION OF FAcT.-The plaintiffs represented that they would use honest
methods to increase the defendant's sales. The defendant gave six promissory
notes in consideration of the plaintiffs' promise to organize and manage contests
to produce this result. The plaintiffs did nothing in the work of organization
and fraudulently cast votes to keep the few contestants close. The defendant
demanded the return of the three notes remaining unpaid, and the plaintiffs sued
to recover on them. Held, that the plaintiffs should not recover, because the
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consideration had failed, although fraud could not be predicated upon representa-
tions, however false, of a promissory character. Records v. Smith (192o, Ind.)
126 N. E. 335.
The general rule appears to be that fraud cannot be predicated on representa-
tions of a promissory character, but only on representations of past or present
fact. Anson, Contract (3d Am. ed. by Corbin, igig) secs. 222 ff. The same test
seems to be applied whether the misrepresentations claimed are set up as a
defence to an action for breach of contract, as a ground for rescission in equity,
or as a basis of the tort action for deceit. Keithley v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
(1916) 271 Ill. 584, 111 N. E. 5o3 (tort) ; see James Music Co. v. Bridge (igo8)
134 Wis. 510, 513, 114 N. W. 1ioS, 11io (defence to replevin); Harris v. True-
blood (1916) 124 Ark. 3o8, 186 S. W. 836 (tort). It is said that a promise alone
is not, in a legal sense, a representation, and that failure to perform does not
make it such. Brown v. Pierce & Co. (1918) 229 Mass. 44, 118 N. E. 266 (counts
in tort and contract) ; see Russ Co. v. M-uscupiabe Land Co. (1898) 120 Calif. 521,
529, 52 Pac. 995, 998 (defence to breach of contract). Some courts say that while
a statement of occurrences to happen in the future when stated as a fact may
amount to fraud, a promise or expression of intention to do something in the
future will not. See Miller v. Sutliff (199o) 241 Ill. 521, 526, 89 N. E. 651, 652
(action to rescind) ; see 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1918) sec.
877. Yet an action for deceit may be had on a promise made at a time when the
promisor had put it out of his physical power to perform by contracting with a
third party. Traber v. Hicks (895) 131 Mo. 18o, 32 S. W. 1145; see COMMENT
(1917) 27 YALa LAW JOURNAL, 691; see (1918) 28 ibid., 415. A distinction
should be made between a promise which the promisor intends to perform, and
one which the promisor at the time of promising intends to break. In the second
case there is a fraudulent misrepresentation of present fact. McLean v. South
Western Casualty Ins. Co. (1916, Okla.) 159 Pac. 66o (rescission); Cermy v.
Paxton & Co. (19o7) 78 Neb. 134, IIck N. W. 882 (tort); see io L. R. A.
(N. S.) 64o, note. Contra, Farris v. Strong (1897) 24 Colo. 107, 48 Pac. 963
(rescission) ; Ingersoll v. Brown & Co. (1917) 205 IIl. Aip. 537 (tort). In the
final analysis an intention, although difficult of proof, is an existing fact. Edginton
v. Fitzmaurice (1894) 29 Ch. Div. 459 (tort) ; Adams v. Gillig (1gio) '99 N. Y.
314, 92 N. E. 670 (tort). With the qualification that if an intent not to perform
at the time of promising can be proved, it should make out a case of fraud in
contract, tort, or equity, the dictum of the principal case is sound. For the effect
of innocent mispresentation, see COMMENT (1918) 28 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 178.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORcF--ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE-PARTIES IN PARi DELicr0.-
The petitioner sought a decree annulling her marriage to the defendant. At the
time of such marriage, as she and the defendant knew, she was the lawful wife of
another. Held, that the decree of annulment should be granted. Davis v. Green
(i919, N. J. Eq.) oS Alt 772.
There has been a growing doubt as to the wisdom of applying the doctrine of
in par delicto universally. In equity exceptions have been made where the
courts have felt that public interest or the justice of the case should operate to
prevent its enforcement. See (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 699. Thus a deed
executed for the purpose of terminating a criminal prosecution has been set aside.
Burton v. MacMillan (1907) 52 Fla. 469, 42 So. 849; Tucker v. Cox (IgIS) Io
S. C. 473, 86 S. E. 28; cf. Schroeder v. Turpin (1913) 253 Mo. 258, 161 S. W. 716.
Even at law, in certain cases of illegal contracts, there has been some tendency
to allow the plaintiff judgment where his actions do not disclose a high degree
of moral turpitude. See (1918) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 1o9o; see Thurston,
Cases in Quasi Contract (1916) ch. 3, sec. 2. The general rule has been applied
to parties in par dclicto seeking the annulment of a marriage. Rooney v. Rooney
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(1895) 54 N. 3. Eq. 231, 34 At. 682. The instant case held, however, that vital
public interests were involved, that the decree of annulment would establish the
status of the parties beyond any doubt, and that if the defendant should remarry,
such marriage and the status of children born therefrom would not be subject
to question. It is submitted that the court applied the most desirable rule. The
courts holding to the contrary admit the invalidity of the second marriage of
which annulment is asked, but disregard the obvious public benefits to be gained
from having such a fact made a matter of record by judicial decree. Neverthe-
less, the wife may be held criminally for bigamy. Cf. Baker v. State (1920, Fla.)
84 So. 99.
PERSONS-INsANE PERSONs-CoNTRAcTs-DFEDs.-The guardian of an insane
person brought suit to set aside two deeds of certain real estate owned by the
ward. The land was conveyed to one Weston, who knew of the mental condition
of the granto-, and then the land was attached by the defendant White and a
judgment recovered. Held, that the deeds should be set aside, even though the
defendant was in the position of an innocent purchaser from the grantee.
Brewster v. Weston (192o, Mass.) 126 N. E. 271.
The issue raised by this case is one concerning which there have been many
contradictory decisions. It seems settled that the deed of an adjudged incom-
petent is absolutely void. Thorpe v. Hanscom (1896) 64 Minn. 2oi, 66 N. W. i;
Redden v. Baker (1882) 86 Ind. I91. But some cases go further and hold that,
as the lunatic has nothing which the law recognizes as a mind, he is not capable
of forming an intent to which the law will give effect; therefore his deeds or
contracts are void, even though he had not been adjudged insane at the time of
the acts. See Dexter v. Hall (1872, U. S.) 15 Wall. 9, 2a; ef. Galloway v.
Hendon (igoi) 131 Ala. 280, 31 So. 603. It is suggested, however, that this view
is based on a mistaken idea as to the mutual assent necessary for a contract.
Actual mental assent is not material, the important thing being what each party
is justified in believing from the actions and words of the other. See Corbin,
Offer and Acceptanci (1917) 26 YALE LAv JOURNAL, 169, 205. Therefore the
weight of authority holds that the deed of an insane person is not void, but
merely voidable. Arnett's Committee v. Owens (igoi) 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1409, 65
S. W. 151; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Sellers (igoo) 154 Ind. 370, 56 N. E. 97. And
where a contract has been made and executed in good faith without knowledge
of the insanity (or of circumstances, such as office found, which have the same
effect as knowledge) the incompetent is under a disability to avoid the contract
unless the other party be put in stata quo. Morris v. Great Northern Ry. (1896)
67 Minn. 74, 69 N. W. 628; Loman z. Paullin (x915, Okla.) 152 Pac. 73. In this
way the court succeeds in sufficiently protecting two innocent parties, and avoids
the extreme view that even where the grantor has offered to return the consid-
eration, the contract cannot be avoided, where there was no knowledge of the
insanity on the part of the grantee. See Bevins v. Lowe (1914) 159 Ky. 439,
443, 167 S. W. 422; cf. Rhoades v. Fuller (1897) 139 Mo. 179, 40 S. W. 76o; see
i Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. 249 ff.
PRoPERT-FIxTuREs-EFF=r OF NEav LEASE ON PRIVILEGE AND POWER OF
REmovAL.In 1857 the plaintiff leased to the defendant a plot of land, on which
the defendant erected a sulphuric acid plant. In 1868 and again in 1912 the de-
fendant took a new lease. On vacating the premises at the expiration of this
third lease the defendant removed certain portions of the chemical plant. The
plaintiff brought an action for a breach of the defendant's covenant to deliver
up the premises in good repair. Held, that the plaintiff should recover, as the
parts of the plant removed were a part of the realty and were not tenant's
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fixtures; and, as an alternate ground, that the tenant had lost his privilege and
power to remove the fixtures by accepting a new lease without reserving the
same. Pole-Carew v. Western Counties Manure Co. (192o, C. A.) 36 Times
L. R. 322.
In the United States some jurisdictions hold that a tenant who accepts a new
lease, silent as to fixtures already erected, thereby loses his privilege to remove
them. Sanitary District of Chicago v. Cook (1897) 169 Ill. 184, 48 N. E. 461;
Laughran v. Ross (1871) 45 N. Y. 792; Watriss v. First National Bank of Cam-
bridge (1878) 124 Mass. 571. The contrary has been held in a steadily growing
number of jurisdictions. Second National Bank v. Merrill Co. (1887) 69 Wis.
501, 34 N. W. 514; Radey v. McCurdy (19o4) 209 Pa. 306, 58 Ati. 559; Sassen
v. Haegle (1914) 125 Minn. 441, 147 N. W. 445. Even in those states where the
strict rule has .been followed it has been subsequently closely limited. Thus a
fine distinction is drawn between ordinary fixtures and trade fixtures, however
firmly attached. Bernheimer v. Adams (1902) 70 App. Div. 114, 75 N. Y. Supp.
93; Thomas v. Gayle (igog) 134 Ky. 330, 12o S. W. 290. And where the second
lease is merely a reitewal, as contrasted with a new lease, the tenant is allowed to
remove his fixtures. Baker v. McClurg (19o2) 198 Ill. 28, 64 N. E. 701; Woods
v. Bank of Haywards (igog) io Calif. App. 93, io6 Pac. 730. Maryland has
repudiated the strict rule by statute. Md. Code, I9O4, art. 53, sec. 28. The reason
usually given in support of the narrow view is that the fixtures are included in
the second lease of the land. This would seem to be a begging of the question;
it should not be inferred that the fixtures passed by the lease unless such an
intention clearly was expressed in the lease. Ogden v. Garrison (1908) 82 Neb.
302, 117 N. W. 714; Wright v. MacDonnell (1895) 88 Tex. 140, 30 S. W. 907.
Since the tenant has the privilege of removal during his first lease the natural
presumption is that he does not intend to give up this valuable privilege. Bergh
v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co. (19o5, C. C. A. 2d) 136 Fed. 368. The idea
that he is giving up his privilege of removing his fixtures by taking out a new
lease never occurs to the lay mind. See Red Diamond Clothing Co. v. Steidinann
(1912) 169 Mo. App. 306, 152 S. W. 609. The reason ordinarily given where a
tenant who has given up possession at the expiration of his lease is not allowed
to subsequently remove his fixtures is to keep him from disturbing his landlord
or a succeeding tenant. But when the tenant stays in possession continuously
under a new lease, this reason obviously does not apply. Cf. Kerr v. Kingsbury
(1878) 39 Mich. i5o. The instant case is plainly sound on its facts as to what
constitutes a fixture. It accords with the earlier English cases in following the
harsher and less desirable rule. Cf. Leschalles v. Woolf [1908] i Ch. 641.
PROPERTY-PEROLATING WTATERS-PRIVILEGE To DIVERT.-The plaintiff and de-
fendant owned adjoining lands. The defendant watered his cattle by tanks fed
by siphons from waters percolating below his lands. The plaintiff sought to
enjoin him from wasting this water by letting it overflow from the tanks into
hog wallows, and claimed that the waste caused the diminution of a spring on
the plaintiff's land. Held, that the plaintiff should have the relief sought.
De Bok v. Doak (192o, Iowa) 176 N. W. 631.
The earliest cases on this subject applied the maxim "cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad cocelun" and held that damages sustained by the diversion of percolat-
ing waters were "damnum absque injuria." Greenleaf v. Francis (1836, Mass.)
18 Pick. 117; Acton v. Blundell (1843, Exch.) 12 M. & W. 324; Chasemore v.
Richards (1859) 7 H. L. Cas. 349; Huber v. Merkel (Igo3) 117 Wis. 355, 94
N. W. 354; cf. Summers, Property in Oil and Gas (1919) a9 YALE LAw JouRNATl,
174. Other reasons assigned were that the uncertain nature of percolating waters
made the application of strict rules difficult; that the act of digging being lawful,
the motive for the act could not make the actor subject to damages. Frazier v.
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Brown (1861) 12 Oh. St 294; Chatfield v. Wilson (1855) 28 Vt. 49; Mayor of
Bradford's Case [1895] A. C. 587. But the increasing importance of the subject
necessitated modifications. First the courts questioned the justice of barring
relief where the obstruction had been actuated by malicious motives. Wheatley
v. Baugh (855) 25 Pa. 528; Swett v. Cutts (187o) 5o N. H. 439; Miller v. Black
Rock Co. (19Ol) 99 Va. 747, 40 S. E. 27; Gagnon v. Hotel Co. (19o4) 163 Ind.
687, 72 N. E. 849. Next they modified the doctrine of the unqualified ownership
of the soil ind its contents by the maxim "sic utere tuo'" and declared that
wasting of percolating water should be prevented when it deprived another of
its legitimate use. Stillwater Water Co. v. Farmers (19o3) 89 Minn. 58, 93 N. W.
907. From this developed the theory that landowners in the same vicinity have
correlative rights in the percolating waters thereof. Patrick v. Smith (1913) 75
Wash. 407, 134 Pac. 1o76; Ballantine v. Public Service (914, Err. & App.) 86 N. J.
Law, 331, 91 At]. 95; Forbell v. City of New York (1goo) 164 N. Y. 522, 58 N. E.
644. Cf. COMMENT (1919) 29 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 213. In determining whether
or not a landholder has the privilege of diverting a flow of percolating water, the
courts examine the reasonableness of the use he is to make of that water. Smith
v. Brooklyn (1897, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 18 Hun, 340; Katz v. Walkinshaw (1902)
141 Calif. 116, 70 Pac. 663; Pence v. Carney (9o5) 58 W. Va. 296, 52 S. E. 702;
Barclay v. Abraham (io3) 121 Iowa, 61g, 96 N. W. iO8O; Schenck v. City of
Ann Arbor (1917) 196 Mich. 75, 163 N. W. 1O9. The instant decision seems to
be in accord with the present tendency of the courts to enjoin such diversion
of percolating waters as will materially injure a landholder to whom they would
eventually come, without proving of equal benefit to the confiscator. For the
obstruction of the natural flow of surface waters by the adjacent land owner, see
(192o) 29 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 686.
SALES-STATUTE OF FRAUDs-SIGNATURE OF PARTY TO BE CHARGED.-Because
their own stationery had not been received from the printer, the defendants
wrote out the plaintiff's order for suits of clothes on the order blank of the
defendants' predecessors in business. The name of the defendants nowhere ap-
peared upon the order blank in question. The purchaser sued for non-delivery
and the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. Held, that the defendants'
motion should have been granted, since there was no sufficient memorandum to
satisfy the statute of frauds. Joseph Galin Co. v. Newhouse (1920, App. Div.)
i8o N. Y. Supp. 812.
Under the statute of frauds in the Sales Act, sec. 4, New York now requires
only that the agreement be signed (formerly required to be subscribed) by the
party to be charged thereby or by his authorized agent. A person may incur
contractual duties under any name, fictitious or assumed. Gotthelf v. Shapiro
(1913) 21o N. Y. 538, 103 N. E. 1124; Roberts v. Mosier (1913) 35 Okla. 691,
132 Pac. 678; see N. I. L. sec. 18. One may sign either by writing a name or
mark or by adopting it when printed. But such adoption, to be effective, must
be made with the intent to authenticate the document. This intent and so an
adoption of the printed name as a signature may fairly be presumed where the
promisor writes a contract on his own paper whereon his nbme appears in print.
Evans v. Hoare [1892] I Q. B. 593; Schneider v. Norris (1814, K. B.) 2 M. & S.
286; Cohen v. Wolgel (IgIg, Sup. Ct) l07 Misc. 505, 176 N. Y. Supp. 764.
Ordinarily where the letter-head is not his own such a presumption would seem
unreasonable. But where, as in the instant case, the paper is that of the former
business which the promisor was continuing, though under a different name, it
is submitted that the continuity of the business presents an element which should
be considered and which might fairly lead to holding the name to have been
adopted as the defendants' signature.
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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - MUTUALITY- STATUTE OF FRAUDS. - In a suit for
specific performance of an oral contract for the sale of realty, the written memo-
randum relied on by the purchaser to take the case out of the statute of frauds
was a receipt for part of the purchase price, signed by the vendor's agent. The
receipt named the parties, the purchase price, and the property bought. The
defence was that as the plaintiff had not signed the memorandum, the agreement
was lacking in the requisite mutuality. Held, that specific performance should be
decreed. Hensel v. Calder (i92o, Md.) io9 Atl. 195.
This decision, in effect at least, brings the Maryland court into accord with the
long line of decisions in other jurisdictions following Hatton v. Gray (1684)
2 Ch. Cas. 164, I Ames, Cases on Equity Jurisprudence (19o4) 421; contra,
Lipscomb v. Watrous (1894) 3 D. C. App. I. It was formerly held that a vendor
who had not signed such a memorandum could not get specific performance
against a vendee who had. Duvall v. Myers (1850) 2 Md. Ch. 4O. That case
followed the rule that mutuality meant mutuality of remedy at the time the con-
tract was made. See Fry, Specific Performance (5th ed. 1911) sec. 463; Lawren-
son v. Butler (18o2, Ir. Ch.) I Sch. & Lef. 13. But it applied the rule to facts
similar to those in the instant case, which had always been regarded as an excep-
tion. See Ames, Mutuality in Specific Performance (1903) 3 CoL.. L. IEv. I, 5;
see Lewis, Specific Performance pf Contracts (1901) 49 Am. LAW REG. 559, 571.
The principal case distinguishes Duvall v. Myers, supra, on the ground that the
vendor's name did not even appear casually in the memorandum in that case.
The distinction bears upon the legal question as to what form of memorandum
is sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, rather than the equitable question
of mutuality. Fry's rule has been properly criticised as overburdened with
exceptions. See Langdell, Specific Performance (1887) I HARV. L. REv. i4; see
CoMMENT (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 261. Pomeroy's statement of the doc-
trine requires fewer: "So far as there is a principle of mutuality, it is a mutual-
ity of remedy in equity at the time of filing the bill that is required." 5 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence (2d ed. igig) sec. 2191. But the most satisfactory rule of
mutuality is that of Ames: "The reciprocity of remedy required . . . is simply
the right (privilege) of one party to refuse to perform, unless performance by
the other is given or assured." Ames, Mutuality in Specific Performance, supra.
In other words, when only the defendant is bound under a contract sought to be
specifically enforced, a decree will be granted, if it can be made conditional on
performance by the plaintiff. It is believed that there are no exceptions to this
rule. Much of the confusion as to the defence of want of mutuality arises from
those cases where it is said that a contract is unenforceable where there is no
mutuality of obligation. But in such cases the reason for not granting relief may
be that there is no contract at all, but only an offer creating a power in the
offeree. See (1917) 26 YAIE LAW JOURNAL, 795; Corbin, Offer and Acceptance
(1916) 26 ibid., 169, i9o; (1917) 26 ibid., 8o2; COMMENT (1920) 29 ibid., 767;
(1919) 28 ibid., 705.
TAXATION-PUBLIC PURPOsE-GOVERNMENT MERCHANDIZING.-The plaintiffs,
taxpayers in the state of North Dakota, brought a bill for an injunction to
restrain the defendants, state officers, from disbursing certain funds or issuing
certain bonds in pursuance of constitutional amendments and statutes alleged to
be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in taking property for other than
public purposes. The amendments and statutes provide that the state should
"engage in the business of manufacturing and marketing farm products" by
establishing a warehouse, elevator, and flour mill system, and "engage in provid-
ing homes for the residents of the state" by providing a commission -endowed
with the power of eminent domain to acquire land on which to build homes and
farmhouses to be sold at minimum rates. Held, that the injunction should not
be granted. Green v. Frazier (1920, N. D.) 176 N. W. II.
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A late decision of the Supreme Court held that it was a public purpose to
provide necessities for the public, and that the state legislatures and courts could
best decide what were included in that term. Jones v. City of Portland (1917)
245 U. S. 217, 38 Sup. Ct. 112, (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 824, 836. The
instant case represents a decidedly liberal view of "necessities." See (1918)
Am. L. REv. 215. Indications are that government operation of a business will be
allowed where regulation of rates and facilities would be sustained. See Com-
MENT (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 824. But operation may even precede such
regulation. Holton -v. Camilla (igo) 134 Ga. 56o, 68 S. E. 472. It would seem
that the concept of "necessities" might soon cover nearly all products, and that
all industries might be regulated or operated as in mediaeval times. It is not
easy to see what limitations will be placed on government operation, but as yet
the furnishing of amusements is unauthorized. State ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch
(1913) 88 Oh. St. 71, 1O2 N. E. 670. And it may be presumed that the operation
must be for the general benefit rather than for a particular group or class. Cf.
Loan Association v. Topeka (1875, U. S.) 20 Wall. 655. However, it is doubtful
if the courts will insist on the curiously unsound requirement that the operation
shall not be for profit. See Jones v. Portland, supra. The court in the instant
case relies for affirmance of its decision on the promises of the Supreme Court
to give great weight to the decision of the state courts on the ground that they
could best judge economic conditions. Cf. Hairston v. Danville and Western Ry.
(19o8) 208 U. S. 598, 28 Sup. Ct. 331; cf. Jones v. Portland, supra. Consistent
holdings could now allow the establishment of different economic systems in
different states. Perhaps the resultant competition would be the best test of the
new economic theories.
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-MESSAGES AccEPTED BY TELEPHONE-OPERATOR
AGENT OF COMPANY AND NOT OF SENDER.-The defendant telegraph company
maintained a telephone in its transmitting office for the purpose of receiving
messages to be sent over its wires. Through the negligence of the operator in
receiving a telegram over the telephone, a mistake was made in the initials of
the addressee. The message failed to reach its destination, thereby causing dam-
age to the plaintiff for which suit was brought. Held, that the plaintiff should
recover, because the operator, in receiving the message over the telephone, was
the agent of the telegraph company and not of the sender. Salisbury v. Western
Union (1919, Mo. App.) 217 S. W. 551.
A telegraph company may place reasonable regulations upon the use of its
service. Stipulations upon a telegraph blank that "no responsibility attaches to
this company concerning messages until the same are accepted at one of its
transmitting offices," and that "if a message is sent to such office by one of the
company's messengers, he acts for that purpose as the agent of the sender," have
been held reasonable. Collatta v. Western Union (192o, Miss.) 83 So. 4Ol,
(192o) 29 YAM LAw JOURNAL, 697. Ayres v. Western Union (igol) 65 App. Div.
149, 72 N. Y. Supp. 634; Stamey v. Westert Union (1893) 92 Ga. 613, 18 S. E.
ioo8. Where the sender was unable to write and requested the operator to write
the message for him, it was held that the operator was acting as the agent of
the sender and that the company was under no duty to pay for mistakes.
Western Union v. Jackson (19o9) 163 Ala. 9. 50 So. 316; Western Union v.
Holcomb (1912, Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. i9o. Nor could the telegraph com-
pany be held when the messages were delivered orally to the operator. West-
ern Union v. Dozier (189o) 67 Miss. 288, 7 So. 325. If the company has
customarily undertaken to transmit messages accepted orally, however, they
have been liable for any error of the operator. Western Union v. Stevenv-
son (1889) 128 Pa. 442, 18 AtI. 441. Likewise, when a telegraph company
maintains a telephone in its transmitting office over which it accepts messages, it
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thereby invites the public to send messages over this telephone. An operator
accepting such message is the agent of the company and it is liable for his errors.
Markley v. Western Union (1913) 159 Iowa, 557, 141 N. W. 443; Postal Tele-
graph & Cable Co. v. Prewitt (1917, Tex. Civ. App.) 199 S. W. 316; Bowie v.
Western Union (1907) 78 S. C. 424, 59 S. E. 65. The instant case is decided
upon the theory accepted by a majority of the courts.
TORTS-JOINT TORT-FEASORS-LABILITY FOR POLLUTION OF WATER-COURSES.-
The plaintiff brought an action for damages against six coal mining corporations
for the pollution of a stream. There was no collusion or concerted action what-
ever between the defendants. Held, that the plaintiff should not recover, because
the defendants were not jointly and severally liable. Farley v. Crystal Coal &
Coke Co. (i92o, W. Va.) 1O2 S. E. 265.
There is a conflict of authority as to whether or not the doctrine of joint
and several responsibility at law should apply to cases of unintended damage
caused by the acts of several persons acting without collusion and independently.
See Cooley, Torts (3d ed. 19o6) z46. The general tendency appears to favor
enforcing a joint and several duty to pay damages where a single injury is
caused by concurrent wrongful acts or omissions. Matthews v. Delaware L. &
W. R. Co. (1893) 56 N. J. Law, 34, 27 AtI. 919 (injury in collision due to joint
negligence of two railroads) ; Corey v,. Havener (19o2) 182 Mass. 250, 65 N. E.
69 (plaintiff's horse frightened by two passing motorcycles). Where the plaintiff
suffers separate injuries, caused by the several defendants, though similar in
character and inflicted at the same time, he can hold the defendants only sever-
ally. State v'. Wood (1896) 59 N. J. Law, 112, 35 Atl. 654; New Orleans Ins.
Ass. v. Harper & Waggaman (188o) 32 La. Ann. 1165; see Shearman & Redfield,
Negligence (6th ed. 1913) sec. i23: Cases of water pollution, though the
defendants do not cause "separate injuries" in this latter sense at all, are almost
universally placed in the second group, and each defendant must be sued for his
contribution to the damage. Chipman v. Palmer (1879) 77 N. Y. 51; Mansfield
v. Brister (1907) 76 Oh. St. 27o, 81 N. E. 631; Thackaberry v. Sioux City Service
Co. (1911) 154 Iowa, 358, 132 N. W. 945, 4o L. R. A. (N. S.) 1O2; cf. Valparaiso
V. Moffit (895) 12 Ind. App. 250, 39 N. E. go. It is difficult to see how the
damage caused by each individual defendant can be identified in these cases, and
logically it would seem far better to place them in the first group and enforce
joint and several responsibility. In the instant case the court overruled a pre-
vious decision on the ground that the cases cited to uphold it dealt with direct
as opposed to consequential injury. Day v. Louisville Coal & Coke Co. (19o6)
60 W. Va. 27, 53 S. E. 776. But the reasons for holding the defendants jointly
are equally strong where the damage is consequential; in either event it seems
impossible to apportion it. Cf. Schumpert v. Southern Ry. (19o2) 65 S. C. 332,
43 S. E. 813; cf. Lyman v'. County of Hampshire (1885) 14o Mass. 311, 3 N. E.
211. In thus overruling the previous decision, the instant case has wiped out
one of the very few decisions which clearly favor joint responsibility at law in
the water-pollution cases. Yet almost all jurisdictions will sustain a joint bill
for an injunction in cases of this type. Warren v. Parkhurst (igo6) 186 N. Y. 45,
78 N. E. 579, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1149, note. It is submitted, therefore, that it
would be more consistent with ideas of modern procedure if the law courts were
to enforce joint and several responsibility. For the obstruction of the natural
flow of surface water by an adjacent landowner, see (192o) 29 YALE LA w
JoURNAr, 686.
